Expectancy and attention bias to spiders: Dissecting anticipation and allocation processes using ERPs.

The current registered report focused on the temporal dynamics of the relationship between expectancy and attention toward threat, to better understand the mechanisms underlying the prioritization of threat detection over expectancy. In the current event-related potentials experiment, a-priori expectancy was manipulated, and attention bias was measured, using a well-validated paradigm. A visual search array was presented, with one of two targets: spiders (threatening) or birds (neutral). A verbal cue stating the likelihood of encountering a target preceded the array, creating congruent and incongruent trials. Following cue presentation, preparatory processes were examined using the contingent negative variation (CNV) component. Following target presentation, two components were measured: early posterior negativity (EPN) and late positive potential (LPP), reflecting early and late stages of natural selective attention toward emotional stimuli, respectively. Behaviorally, spiders were found faster than birds, and congruency effects emerged for both targets. For the CNV, a non-significant trend of more negative amplitudes following spider cues emerged. As expected, EPN and LPP amplitudes were larger for spider targets compared to bird targets. Data-driven, exploratory, topographical analyses revealed different patterns of activation for bird cues compared to spider cues. Furthermore, 400-500 ms post-target, a congruency effect was revealed only for bird targets. Together, these results demonstrate that while expectancy for spider appearance is evident in differential neural preparation, the actual appearance of spider target overrides this expectancy effect and only in later stages of processing does the cueing effect come again into play.

Need for cognition moderates the relief of avoiding cognitive effort.

When making decisions, humans aim to maximize rewards while minimizing costs. The exertion of mental or physical effort has been proposed to be one those costs, translating into avoidance of behaviors carrying effort demands. This motivational framework also predicts that people should experience positive affect when anticipating demand that is subsequently avoided (i.e., a "relief effect"), but evidence for this prediction is scarce. Here, we follow up on a previous study [1] that provided some initial evidence that people more positively evaluated outcomes if it meant they could avoid performing an additional demanding task. However, the results from this study did not provide conclusive evidence that this effect was driven by effort avoidance. Here, we report two experiments that are able to do this. Participants performed a gambling task, and if they did not receive reward they would have to perform an orthogonal effort task. Prior to the gamble, a cue indicated whether this effort task would be easy or hard. We probed hedonic responses to the reward-related feedback, as well as after the subsequent effort task feedback. Participants reported lower hedonic responses for no-reward outcomes when high vs. low effort was anticipated (and later exerted). They also reported higher hedonic responses for reward outcomes when high vs. low effort was anticipated (and avoided). Importantly, this relief effect was smaller in participants with high need for cognition. These results suggest that avoidance of high effort tasks is rewarding, but that the size off this effect depends on the individual disposition to engage with and expend cognitive effort. They also raise the important question of whether this disposition alters the cost of effort per se, or rather offset this cost during cost-benefit analyses.

Parsing the contributions of negative affect vs. aversive motivation to cognitive control: an experimental investigation.

Introduction: Punishment is a powerful drive that fosters aversive motivation and increases negative affect. Previous studies have reported that this drive has the propensity to improve cognitive control, as shown by improved conflict processing when it is used. However, whether aversive motivation per se or negative affect eventually drives this change remains unclear because in previous work, the specific contribution of these two components could not be isolated. Methods: To address this question, we conducted two experiments where we administered the confound minimized Stroop task to a large group of participants each time (N = 50 and N = 47 for Experiment 1 and 2, respectively) and manipulated punishment and feedback contingency using a factorial design. These two experiments were similar except that in the second one, we also measured awareness of feedback contingency at the subjective level. We reasoned that cognitive control would improve the most when punishment would be used, and the contingency between this motivational drive and performance would be reinforced, selectively. Results: Both experiments consistently showed that negative affect increased at the subjective level when punishment was used and the feedback was contingent on task performance, with these two effects being additive. In Experiment 1, we found that when the feedback was contingent on task performance and punishment was activated, conflict processing did not improve. In Experiment 2, we found that conflict processing improved when punishment was contingent on task performance, and participants were aware of this contingency. Discussion: These results suggest that aversive motivation can improve conflict processing when participants are aware of the link created between punishment and performance.

A systematic exploration of attentional load effects on the C1 ERP component.

The C1 ERP component reflects the earliest visual processing in V1. However, it remains debated whether attentional load can influence it or not. We conducted two EEG experiments to investigate the effect of attentional load on the C1. Task difficulty was manipulated at fixation using an oddball detection task that was either easy (low load) or difficult (high load), while the distractor was presented in the upper visual field (UVF) to score the C1. In Experiment 1, we used a block design and the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the central stimulus and the peripheral distractor was either short or long. In Experiment 2, task difficulty was manipulated on a trial-by-trial basis using a visual cue, and the peripheral distractor was presented either before or after the central stimulus. The results showed that the C1 was larger in the high compared to the low load condition irrespective of SOA in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, no significant load modulation of the C1 was observed. However, we found that the contingent negative variation (CNV) was larger in the low compared to the high load condition. Moreover, the C1 was larger when the peripheral distractor was presented after than before the central stimulus. Combined together, these results suggest that different top-down control processes can influence the initial feedforward stage of visual processing in V1 captured by the C1 ERP component.

The selective use of punishments on congruent versus incongruent trials in the Stroop task.

Conflict adaptation refers to the dynamic modulation of conflict processing across successive trials and reflects improved cognitive control. Interestingly, aversive motivation can increase conflict adaptation, although it remains unclear through which process this modulation occurs because previous studies presented punishment feedback following suboptimal performance on both congruent and incongruent trials. According to integrative accounts of conflict monitoring and aversive motivation in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, punishment feedback following slow or erroneous performance on incongruent trials in particular should lead to improved conflict adaptation. Second, selectively increasing motivation on incongruent trials should reduce the overall congruency effect. The current study sought to test both hypotheses. Specifically, we administered the confound-minimized Stroop task to a large group of participants and manipulated the position of feedback (following either congruent or incongruent trials) and aversive motivation (tied to a monetary loss or not) across different blocks. As expected, the congruency effect was found to be smaller when punishment was coupled with incongruent versus congruent trials. However, results showed that conflict adaptation was increased when punishment feedback was selectively coupled with congruent rather than incongruent trials. Together, these results suggest that aversive motivation does not uniformly improve cognitive control but this gain appears to be context dependent.

Effects of selective attention on the C1 ERP component: A systematic review and meta-analysis.

The C1 event-related potential (ERP) captures the earliest stage of feedforward processing in the primary visual cortex (V1). An ongoing debate is whether top-down selective attention can modulate the C1. One side of the debate pointed out that null findings appear to outnumber positive findings; thus, selective attention does not seem to influence the C1. However, this suggestion is not based on a valid approach to summarizing evidence across studies. Therefore, we conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis investigating the effects of selective attention on the C1, involving 47 experiments and 794 subjects in total. Despite heterogeneity across studies, results suggested that attention has a moderate effect on the C1 (Cohen's d z  = 0.33, p < .0001); that is, C1 amplitude is larger for visual stimuli that are attended than unattended. These results suggest that C1 is affected by top-down selective attention.

Modulation of Conflict Processing by Reappraisal: An Experimental Investigation.

Negative affect facilitates conflict processing. Here we sought to assess whether symmetrically, its downregulation by means of reappraisal could lower it. To this end, 105 participants performed the confound-minimized Stroop task eliciting negative affect that was followed by a simple reward-related visual discrimination task. Conflict processing was induced with the former task. Half of them (experimental group) were instructed to use this second task to downregulate negative affect arising from the Stroop task. The other half (control group) did not receive these appraisal-related instructions. Group comparisons showed that negative affect and the conflict effect were similar for these two groups. However, when we added and modeled the subjective ratings related to emotion regulation, we found that conflict processing significantly improved for participants who reported using reappraisal spontaneously, and this gain occurred irrespective of negative affect. These results suggest that reappraisal can influence conflict processing but this change does not depend on negative affect.

Reduced flexibility of cognitive control: reactive, but not proactive control, underpins the congruency sequence effect.

The congruency sequence effect (CSE) refers to facilitated conflict processing following incongruent than congruent trials, and reflects enhanced cognitive control during conflict processing. Although this effect is mostly conceived as being reactive, proactive control can also unlock it under specific circumstances according to previous studies (e.g., when an informative cue is used). However, whether or not humans can flexibly switch between these two complementing control modes remains unclear. To address this question, 55 participants completed the confound-minimized Stroop task in different blocks where the cue about the upcoming trial's congruency was either informative or not, and orthogonally to it, the cue-stimulus interval (CSI) was either short or long. We tested if the size of the CSE could change depending on the specific combination of these two factors, which would indicate that cognitive control depends on the subtle balance between reactive and proactive control, and is therefore flexible. However, results showed that the CSE was significant and comparable across the four combinations of CSI and Cue type, suggesting that it primarily stemmed from reactive control. We discuss our results against the dual mechanism of control (DMC) framework (Braver in Trends Cogn Sci 16:106-113, 2012).

Top-Down Modulation of Early Visual Processing in V1: Dissociable Neurophysiological Effects of Spatial Attention, Attentional Load and Task-Relevance.

Until today, there is an ongoing discussion if attention processes interact with the information processing stream already at the level of the C1, the earliest visual electrophysiological response of the cortex. We used two highly powered experiments (each N = 52) and examined the effects of task relevance, spatial attention, and attentional load on individual C1 amplitudes for the upper or lower visual hemifield. Bayesian models revealed evidence for the absence of load effects but substantial modulations by task-relevance and spatial attention. When the C1-eliciting stimulus was a task-irrelevant, interfering distracter, we observed increased C1 amplitudes for spatially unattended stimuli. For spatially attended stimuli, different effects of task-relevance for the two experiments were found. Follow-up exploratory single-trial analyses revealed that subtle but systematic deviations from the eye-gaze position at stimulus onset between conditions substantially influenced the effects of attention and task relevance on C1 amplitudes, especially for the upper visual field. For the subsequent P1 component, attentional modulations were clearly expressed and remained unaffected by these deviations. Collectively, these results suggest that spatial attention, unlike load or task relevance, can exert dissociable top-down modulatory effects at the C1 and P1 levels.

Task Learnability Modulates Surprise but Not Valence Processing for Reinforcement Learning in Probabilistic Choice Tasks.

The goal of temporal difference (TD) reinforcement learning is to maximize outcomes and improve future decision-making. It does so by utilizing a prediction error (PE), which quantifies the difference between the expected and the obtained outcome. In gambling tasks, however, decision-making cannot be improved because of the lack of learnability. On the basis of the idea that TD utilizes two independent bits of information from the PE (valence and surprise), we asked which of these aspects is affected when a task is not learnable. We contrasted behavioral data and ERPs in a learning variant and a gambling variant of a simple two-armed bandit task, in which outcome sequences were matched across tasks. Participants were explicitly informed that feedback could be used to improve performance in the learning task but not in the gambling task, and we predicted a corresponding modulation of the aspects of the PE. We used a model-based analysis of ERP data to extract the neural footprints of the valence and surprise information in the two tasks. Our results revealed that task learnability modulates reinforcement learning via the suppression of surprise processing but leaves the processing of valence unaffected. On the basis of our model and the data, we propose that task learnability can selectively suppress TD learning as well as alter behavioral adaptation based on a flexible cost-benefit arbitration.

#EEGManyLabs: Investigating the replicability of influential EEG experiments.

There is growing awareness across the neuroscience community that the replicability of findings about the relationship between brain activity and cognitive phenomena can be improved by conducting studies with high statistical power that adhere to well-defined and standardised analysis pipelines. Inspired by recent efforts from the psychological sciences, and with the desire to examine some of the foundational findings using electroencephalography (EEG), we have launched #EEGManyLabs, a large-scale international collaborative replication effort. Since its discovery in the early 20th century, EEG has had a profound influence on our understanding of human cognition, but there is limited evidence on the replicability of some of the most highly cited discoveries. After a systematic search and selection process, we have identified 27 of the most influential and continually cited studies in the field. We plan to directly test the replicability of key findings from 20 of these studies in teams of at least three independent laboratories. The design and protocol of each replication effort will be submitted as a Registered Report and peer-reviewed prior to data collection. Prediction markets, open to all EEG researchers, will be used as a forecasting tool to examine which findings the community expects to replicate. This project will update our confidence in some of the most influential EEG findings and generate a large open access database that can be used to inform future research practices. Finally, through this international effort, we hope to create a cultural shift towards inclusive, high-powered multi-laboratory collaborations.

Early reduction of sensory processing within the visual cortex when switching from internal to external attention.

The neurocognitive process underlying attention switches between external (perception-based) and internal (memory-based) attention is poorly characterized. Previous research has found that when participants switch attention either between two perception-based tasks (within-domain switches) or between a memory- and a perception-based task (between-domain switches), a substantial and similar processing cost was observed compared to the repetition of the same task (Verschooren, Schindler, De Raedt, & Pourtois, 2019). Here, we recorded 64-channel EEG while participants carried out within- versus between-domain switches of attention. ERP results showed that during early sensory processing, a marked P1 attenuation was associated with both switch types, suggesting that switching was associated with an early bottleneck during information processing. This early gating effect was stronger when switching from an internal to an external task, compared to switching between external tasks, suggesting different top-down requirements for them. These findings are in line with earlier proposals in the literature.

Learning biases to angry and happy faces during Pavlovian aversive conditioning.

Learning biases in Pavlovian aversive conditioning have been found in response to specific categories of threat-relevant stimuli, such as snakes or angry faces. This has been suggested to reflect a selective predisposition to preferentially learn to associate stimuli that provided threats to survival across evolution with aversive outcomes. Here, we contrast with this perspective by highlighting that both threatening (angry faces) and rewarding (happy faces) social stimuli can produce learning biases during Pavlovian aversive conditioning. Using a differential aversive conditioning paradigm, the present study (N = 107) showed that the conditioned response to angry and happy faces was more readily acquired and more resistant to extinction than the conditioned response to neutral faces. Strikingly, whereas the effects for angry faces were of moderate size, the conditioned response persistence to happy faces was of relatively small size and influenced by interindividual differences in their affective evaluation, as indexed by a Go/No-Go Association Task. Computational reinforcement learning analyses further suggested that angry faces were associated with a lower inhibitory learning rate than happy faces, thereby inducing a greater decrease in the impact of negative prediction error signals that contributed to weakening extinction learning. Altogether, these findings provide further evidence that the occurrence of learning biases in Pavlovian aversive conditioning is not specific to threat-related stimuli and depends on the stimulus' affective relevance to the organism. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Children's automatic evaluation of self-generated actions is different from adults.

Performance monitoring (PM) is central to learning and decision making. It allows individuals to swiftly detect deviations between actions and intentions, such as response errors, and adapt behavior accordingly. Previous research showed that in adult participants, error monitoring is associated with two distinct and robust behavioral effects. First, a systematic slowing down of reaction time speed is typically observed following error commission, which is known as post-error slowing (PES). Second, response errors have been reported to be automatically evaluated as negative events in adults. However, it remains unclear whether (1) children process response errors as adults do (PES), (2) they also evaluate them as negative events, and (3) their responses vary according to the pedagogy experienced. To address these questions, we adapted a simple decision-making task previously validated in adults to measure PES as well as the affective processing of response errors. We recruited 8- to 12-year-old children enrolled in traditional (N = 56) or Montessori (N = 45) schools, and compared them to adults (N = 46) on the exact same task. Results showed that children processed correct actions as positive events, and that adults processed errors as negative events. By contrast, PES was similarly observed in all groups. Moreover, the former effect was observed in traditional schoolchildren, but not in Montessori schoolchildren. These findings suggest that unlike PES, which likely reflects an age-invariant attention orienting toward response errors, their affective processing depends on both age and pedagogy.

More efficient shielding for internal than external attention? Evidence from asymmetrical switch costs.

At present, the process of switching attention between external stimuli and internal representations is not well understood. To address this, Verschooren, Liefooghe, Brass, and Pourtois (2019) recently designed a novel paradigm where participants were cued to switch attention between external and internal information on a trial-by-trial basis. The authors observed an asymmetrical switch cost, which was larger when switching toward internal than external material, even though participants performed internal trials faster. In the current study, we sought to establish the cause of this asymmetry by adjudicating among predictions from three theoretical accounts: associative interference, priming, and memory retrieval. After replicating the original asymmetry (Experiment 1), we demonstrated that trial-by-trial carryover of attentional settings is not a necessary precondition (Experiment 2). The results from Experiment 3 indicate that the cost asymmetry can be best explained by an associative interference account, against a memory retrieval one. Together, these results therefor provide evidence in favor of an associative interference account and document that shielding attention for internal representations from external intrusions is more efficient than the other way around. This finding advances our understanding of a core aspect of cognitive flexibility and the relationship between external and internal attention. More research on this question and novel ones raised by it are necessary, however. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Neurophysiological evidence for evaluative feedback processing depending on goal relevance.

Feedback signaling the success or failure of actions is readily exploited to implement goal-directed behavior. Two event-related brain potentials (ERPs) have been identified as reliable markers of evaluative feedback processing: the Feedback-Related Negativity (FRN) and the P3. Recent ERP studies have shown a substantial reduction of these components when the feedback's goal relevance (in terms of goal informativeness) was decreased. However, it remains unclear whether this lowering of evaluative feedback processing at the FRN and P3 levels (i) reflects a common regulation process operating across them or (ii) indirectly and mostly depends on valence processing. To address these questions, 44 participants performed a time estimation task wherein the perceived goal relevance of the feedback following each decision was manipulated via instructions in different blocks. We recorded 64-channel EEG and collected subjective ratings of feedback valence and relevance, separately for goal-relevant and irrelevant conditions. ERP results showed a substantial reduction of the FRN and P3 components for irrelevant than relevant feedback, despite the balanced task relevance between them. Moreover, a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) showed that these two successive ERP effects had dissociable spatiotemporal properties. Crucially, a multivariate multiple regression analysis revealed that goal relevance per se, but not valence, was the unique significant predictor of the amplitude reduction of the FRN and P3 when the feedback was goal irrelevant. Our results suggest that although these ERP components exhibit non-overlapping spatiotemporal properties and performance monitoring effects, they can both be modulated by a common, valence-unspecific process related to goal relevance.

Modulatory effects of positive mood and approach motivation on reward processing: Two sides of the same coin?

In a previous study (Paul & Pourtois, 2017), we found that positive mood substantially influenced the neural processing of reward, mostly by altering expectations and creating an optimistic bias. Under positive mood, the Reward Positivity (RewP) component and fronto-medial theta activity (FMθ) in response to monetary feedback were both changed compared with neutral mood. Nevertheless, whether positive valence per se or motivational intensity drove these neurophysiological effects remained unclear. To address this question, we combined a mindset manipulation with an imagery procedure to create and maintain three different affective states using a between-subjects design: a neutral mood, and positive mood with either high or low motivational intensity. After mood induction, 161 participants performed a simple gambling task while 64-channel EEG was recorded. FMθ activity results showed that irrespective of motivational intensity, positive compared with neutral mood altered reward expectancy. By comparison, RewP was not affected by positive mood nor motivational intensity. These results suggest that positive mood, rather than motivational intensity, is likely driving the change in reward expectation during gambling, which could reflect the presence of an optimistic bias. Moreover, at the methodological level, they confirm that the RewP ERP component and FMθ activity can capture dissociable effects during reward processing.

Dissociable effects of reward magnitude on fronto-medial theta and FRN during performance monitoring.

Reward processing is influenced by reward magnitude, as previous EEG studies showed changes in amplitude of the feedback-related negativity (FRN) and reward positivity (RewP), or power of fronto-medial theta (FMθ). However, it remains unclear whether these changes are driven by increased reward sensitivity, altered reward predictions, enhanced cognitive control, or a combination of these effects. To address this question, we asked 36 participants to perform a simple gambling task where feedback valence (reward vs. no-reward), its magnitude (small vs. large reward), and expectancy (expected vs. unexpected) were manipulated in a factorial design, while 64-channel EEG was recorded concurrently. We performed standard ERP analyses (FRN and RewP) as well as time-frequency decompositions (FMθ) of feedback-locked EEG data. Subjective reports showed that large rewards were more liked and expected than small ones. At the EEG level, increasing magnitude led to a larger RewP irrespective of expectancy, whereas the FRN was not influenced by this manipulation. In comparison, FMθ power was overall increased when reward magnitude was large, except if it was unexpected. These results show dissociable effects of reward magnitude on the RewP and FMθ power. Further, they suggest, that although large reward magnitude boosts reward processing (RewP), it can nonetheless undermine the need for enhanced cognitive control (FMθ) in case reward is unexpected. We discuss these new results in terms of optimistic bias or positive mood resulting from an increased reward magnitude.